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TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PATIENTS IN AN EMERGENCY:
ADDRESSING EXORBITANT AND UNEXPECTED
AMBULANCE BILLS
GEORGE A. NATION III*
I. INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE for a moment that you are working-out at a health club, doingsome weightlifting or some cardio.  After your workout, you take a
shower.  You are tired, the locker room was very hot, and by the time you
get out front near the entrance to the club, you are feeling lightheaded
and pass out.  A bystander quickly calls 911 and reports the apparent
emergency, and the 911-dispatcher contacts the nearest, or often the only,
emergency ambulance service.1  Minutes later an ambulance arrives
staffed by two emergency medical technicians (EMTs).2  You are taken
three miles to the to the nearest emergency room.  How much should you
be required to pay for the emergency ambulance service you received but
did not contract for?3  The focus of this Article is on developing an appro-
priate method to answer that question.4
The ambulance that took you to the hospital may have been provided
by a private for-profit company; a nonprofit such as the local acute care
hospital; a public provider, such as the fire department or a separate mu-
* Professor of Law & Business, Lehigh University
1. See, e.g., Lisa Zamosky, Who Pays for the Ambulance?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/23/business/la-fi-healthcare-watch-
20130825 [https://perma.cc/N4YS-TTKE] (“In Los Angeles and in many parts of
the country, emergency ambulance services—those that show up following a call to
911—don’t hold contracts with insurance companies, so there’s no point worrying
about whether you’re being picked up by an in-network provider.”).
2. See infra notes 30–81 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Chris Coffey, Ambulance Rides Leave Patients with Sticker Shock, NBC 5
CHI. (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/Ambulance-
Rides-Leaving-Patients-With-Sticker-Shock-254661651.html [https://perma.cc/
7LDF-N4HA] (“The police won’t send you a bill for their help.  Firefighters don’t
charge you to extinguish flames.  After all, those services are covered by property
taxes.  But most municipalities in greater Chicago will charge you for emergency
transports.  Ambulance fees range between $365 and $2,500, depending on the
level of care and other factors such as mileage . . . .”).
4. The focus of this Article is on emergency ground ambulance transporta-
tion; however, the issues discussed here are very similar to those involved in emer-
gency air ambulance transportation and, more broadly, emergency medical
treatment of any type.  The predominant characteristic in all of these situations is
the presence of an emergency, which precludes the ability of the patient to con-
tract for the medical services that they need.  As a result, the recommendations
included here, while focused specifically on addressing the problems associated
with emergency ground ambulance transportation, also serve as a good template
for addressing similar problems that arise with respect to emergency air ambu-
lance transportation and emergency medical care in general.
(747)
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nicipal emergency medical services (EMS) provider; or by a volunteer am-
bulance company.5  The bill you receive for the ambulance service could
be anywhere from $0 to over $2,500 depending on the identity of the or-
ganization that provided the emergency ambulance service.6  For exam-
ple, some volunteer ambulance services and a few municipal providers do
not charge at all for their service.  However, many fire departments that
do not charge for sending a fire truck do charge for sending an ambu-
lance and providing emergency services .7  The rates charged by ambu-
lance service providers, just like the prices charged by hospitals, vary
widely from one provider to another.8  In addition, unpaid ambulance
bills, like hospital bills, are sometimes sent quickly to collections even
while the patient is trying to appeal the amount of the bill, and this can
result in people having their credit ruined as a result of an exorbitant
ambulance bill.9
Moreover, in the case of emergency services, the patient is often un-
conscious or otherwise incapacitated due to the medical emergency and
therefore unable to agree or to negotiate for the EMS service received.10
As a result, patients are in a very vulnerable position when it comes to
receiving emergency ambulance service.11  EMS service is something that
5. See infra notes 60–81 and accompanying text.
6. See Coffey, supra note 3.  In the case of emergency air ambulance services,
the bills are much higher, often in the range of $50,000–$100,000. See, e.g., Corin
Cates-Carney, When the Only Ambulance Is a Helicopter, ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/01/air-ambulance-helicopter-
cost/425061/ [https://perma.cc/8JNQ-9UKS] (noting that in case discussed in ar-
ticle, trip from Butte, Montana, to Seattle, Washington, had full charge price of
$69,000, of which patient’s insurance company paid $13,000 originally and then
after negotiation agreed to pay additional $30,000 and provider agreed to waive
$26,000 of original charge).  Of course, in the case of emergency medical care in
general, the bills are much higher.
7. See infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Curtis Gilbert, Ride to the Hospital Now, Pay Later—and Pay and Pay,
MPRNEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/03/09/ambul
ance-fees [https://perma.cc/2A8D-R8X5] (citing survey conducted by Minnesota
Ambulance Association that found fees ranging from $450 to about $1,900 for
basic life support (lowest level of emergency services) in 2012).  The article notes
that just like hospital list prices, these ambulance fees are often subject to deep
discounts. See id.
9. See Zamosky, supra note 1 (noting that ambulance bills are sent to collec-
tions and that some people have their credit ruined even though insurance ulti-
mately pays bill).
10. See, e.g., Alex Medearis, The Wild West of Ambulance Charges, PRICECONOMICS
(Dec. 9, 2013), https://priceonomics.com/the-wild-west-of-ambulance-charges/
[https://perma.cc/YWN8-95M] (“When people need an ambulance, they’re usu-
ally not thinking about in-network benefits.  In emergencies, the decision may be
out of the patient’s control if a bystander calls 911 or if he or she is unconscious.
And even when a patient is cost-conscious, there may be only one local provider or
the decision may be made by the dispatch system.  As the costs of America’s
patchwork system vary dramatically, whether a patient receives a manageable bill
or a crippling one is ultimately a matter of chance.”).
11. See id.
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may save a patient’s life, but it is also something that may cause financial
hardship or ruin.12  Moreover, emergency ambulance service is also some-
thing over which the patient usually has very little or no control.13
What makes the current situation intolerable is that many ambulance
service providers take advantage of the situation by charging patients
grossly inflated fees for their services.14  As noted, rates for ambulance
service at the basic level, referred to as basic life support (BLS), can range
from less than $200 to over $2,000, and rates for advanced life support
(ALS) are higher.15  This situation is made even worse by the fact that
many patients are caught in the middle of billing disputes between insur-
ance companies and emergency service providers.  This occurs for two rea-
sons.  First, most insurers, both public and private, pay only a small
portion of the unreasonably high amount demanded by most ambulance
service providers.16  Second, many emergency ambulance providers refuse
to enter into contracts with insurers.  As a result, the vast majority of pa-
tients are considered “out-of-network” (OON) and are therefore responsi-
ble to pay the balance of the bill, which is the difference between the
amount reimbursed by the insurer and the amount charged by the service
provider.17  Finally, many ambulance services have either an express or a
de facto monopoly.18  That is, many communities have only one emer-
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Coffey, supra note 3 (noting fees ranging from $365 to $2,500).
15. See id.
16. See infra notes 198–228 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 197–228 and accompanying text for discussion on how in-
surance coverage for ambulance services works much the same way as for hospital
and other medical care.  That is, if the patient receives service from an in-network
provider, then the patient only owes any deductible, co-pay, and coinsurance
amount to the provider.  However, if the provider is out-of-network, then the pa-
tient is liable to pay the difference between the discounted amount paid by the
patient’s insurance company and the full charge of the provider.  Because many
ambulance providers, like many hospitals, set their list prices at exorbitant levels,
the balance is substantial.  The practice of health care providers suing insured but
out-of-network patients for the amount of the providers’ full charge that was not
paid by the patient’s insurance company is known as balance billing. See Mary Ann
Roser, Even with Insurance, That EMS Bill Could Cause Sticker Shock, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMEN (Apr. 13, 2014), https://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/Even-with-in-
surance-that-EMS-bill-could-cause-sticker-shock-a-489364 [https://perma.cc/
VP3H-PRWG] (“‘When you call 911, you get no say in who shows up,’ said Stacey
Pogue, a senior policy analyst with the Austin-based Center for Public Policy Priori-
ties.  ‘That scenario is exactly why you need protection in an emergency.  You have
a 100 percent chance in Austin of getting an out-of-network ambulance ride.  I
think that would be somewhat shocking to a consumer.  Balance billing can be
crippling for families.’”)
18. See, e.g., Michelle Andrews, Out-of-Network Ambulance Rides Can Bring Out-of-
Pocket Expenses, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 14, 2011), http://khn.org/news/
michelle-andrews-on-ambulance-fees/ [https://perma.cc/L4RS-SG4Q] (noting
that there are no in-network ambulance services in Santa Cruz County where pa-
tient being discussed lived, and noting further this patient’s experience is not unu-
sual); Ashlee Kieler, $164 Per Mile: Surprise Ambulance Bills Are a Growing Problem and
3
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gency ambulance service that has been granted exclusive status by the lo-
cal government.19  This means that if the exclusive emergency ambulance
service provider is not in-network with the patient’s insurance company
(some ambulance providers refuse to go in-network with any insurers),
then even patients with knowledge and ability (most patients have
neither) cannot arrange for in-network service and are stuck with an enor-
mous bill that they had absolutely no control over incurring.
Legally, emergency ambulance service providers base their claims for
payment on quasi-contract and the legal doctrine known as the emergency
exception.20  The law recognizes through the equitable doctrine of
quasi-contract that where emergency medical services are provided to a
patient, the patient becomes responsible to pay the fair value of the ser-
vices received even though the patient did not agree to pay for the ser-
vices.21  In this context, the law makes the usually reasonable assumption
that a patient in need of emergency care would, if the patient were able,
agree to pay the reasonable value of such care in order to receive the
necessary care.22  In addition, this doctrine encourages physicians and
other health care providers to render services to such patients, confident
that they will receive reasonable compensation for the services they
provide.23
The problem is that traditionally, courts have determined reasonable
value by looking at the usual and customary charges of the provider.24  In
the hospital billing context, courts are beginning to recognize that there is
a big difference between usual and customary charges and the usual and
customary amount that providers actually get paid, and agree to accept as
full payment, for their services.  The same is true in the context of charges
for emergency ambulance services.25  The amounts billed by many provid-
Difficult to Avoid, CONSUMERIST (Feb. 22, 2016), https://consumerist.com/2016/
02/22/164-per-mile-surprise-ambulance-bills-are-a-growing-problem-difficult-to-
avoid/ [https://perma.cc/4FBY-TAJS] (“[S]ome insurance companies believe am-
bulance providers choose not to contract with insurers because they wouldn’t be
able to recoup as much for their services as they can when they bill patients as out-
of-network providers.”).
19. See, e.g., Roser, supra note 17 (noting “Austin-Travis County Emergency
Medical Services is the exclusive emergency ambulance provider in the county”
and is not in-network with any insurers because it is partially publicly funded.).
20. See infra notes 82–124 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1137
(Cal. 2011) (citing Malone v. Sierra Ry. Co. of Cal., 91 P. 522, 523 (Cal. 1907))
(explaining medical expenses actually paid by or on behalf of patient, not billed
charges based on chargemaster rates, is proper measure of medical expenses);
Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc., 705 So. 2d 926, 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding healthcare agreement to have implied covenant to charge reasonable
fee); Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (“A patient may not be bound by unreasonable charges in an agree-
4
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ers are exorbitant and far in excess of what is reasonable based either on
costs or usual reimbursements.26  Many emergency ambulance service
providers, like many hospitals, charge outrageously inflated prices simply
because they can, due to the vulnerable position of patients and the fail-
ure of competition to rein in pricing.27  Charging exorbitant amounts for
ment to pay charges in accordance with ‘standard and current rates.’” (quoting
Mercy Hosp. v. Carr, 297 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974))); Victory
Mem’l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (permitting jury
question as to whether charges presented by hospital were reasonable); Butler v.
Ind. Dep’t of Ins., 904 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ind. 2009) (explaining medical expenses
actually paid by or on behalf of patient, not billed charges based on chargemaster
rates, is proper measure of medical expenses); In re N.J.A.C., 979 A.2d 770, 784–85
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (presuming regulation of physician fee schedule
was reasonable and valid); Kastick v. U-Haul Co. of W. Mich., 292 A.D.2d 797,
798–99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (agreeing with defendants that plaintiff could not
recover damages in amount she was never obligated to pay for medical services);
Nassau Anesthesia Assocs. P.C. v. Chin, 924 N.Y.S.2d 252, 254 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2011)
(citing Temple Univ. Hosp. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts. Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 508–10
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)) (agreeing reasonable value of medical services is average
amount that provider would have accepted as full payment from third-party payers
such as private insurers and federal healthcare programs); Moorhead v. Crozer
Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 2001) (holding patient’s recovery for
medical expenses in malpractice suit was limited to amount paid and accepted for
services, rather than fair and reasonable market value of services), abrogated by
Northbrook Life Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 949 A.2d 333, 337 (Pa. 2008); Temple
Univ. Hosp. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003) (stating that chargemaster rate “bears no relationship to the amount typi-
cally paid for those services”); Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d
191, 198–99 (Tenn. 2001) (affirming lower court holding that patient was obli-
gated to pay reasonable charges for medical services and fair value of goods fur-
nished); Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 397 (Tex. 2011) (explaining
medical expenses actually paid by or on behalf of patient, not billed charges based
on chargemaster rates, is proper measure of medical expenses); Daughters of
Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007)
(finding chargemaster prices are not value of medical services in context of hospi-
tal lien statute); cf. Holland v. Trinity Health Care Corp., 791 N.W.2d 724, 728
(Mich. Ct. App 2010) (finding chargemaster rates are “usual and customary”).
26. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 18 (“In Massachusetts, [Blue Cross Blue
Shield] says that getting more private EMS providers into its network would reduce
costs.  ‘This . . . is really about whether individuals, families and employers should
pay 80 to 100 million dollars a year because private out-of-network ambulance
companies are allowed to charge rates that are three to five times above what Medi-
care pays them for the very same service,’ says Jay McQuaide, senior vice president
of corporate communications for BCBS of Massachusetts.”).
27. See, e.g., Roser, supra note 17 (quoting Stacey Pogue, senior policy analyst
with Austin-based Center for Public Policy Priorities: “Balance Billing [for emer-
gency ambulance service] can be crippling for families”).  Also, when communities
grant exclusive EMS rights to providers, prices and balance billing amounts go up.
See id. (“Negotiated rates for medical care generally entitle private insurance com-
panies to a substantial cut in cost.  But EMS providers have no incentive to negoti-
ate discounted rates with insurers, said Douglas Hooten, president of the Texas
EMS Alliance and of the Coalition of Advanced Emergency Medical Systems.
That’s especially true when there are no other 911 competitors in a community.”).
With respect to similar issues in the context of hospital and doctor medical bills,
see generally George A. Nation III, Determining the Fair and Reasonable Value of Medi-
5
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emergency ambulance services is unfair to all patients and results in signif-
icant financial hardship for many.
This Article develops a process for determining the fair and reasona-
ble value of emergency ambulance services.28  It is important to expressly
state right at the outset that the only thing worse than being charged an
exorbitant rate for ambulance service is having no ambulance services
available.  Ambulance services are extremely important, and great strides
have been made in trauma care and pre-hospital care.29  These critical
services cost money and must be paid for.  However, that is not an excuse
for overcharging individual patients.  Part II provides a brief overview and
history of ambulance service in the United States.  Part III provides an
analysis of patients’ legal obligation to pay for emergency ambulance ser-
vices.  Part IV discusses a process for determining the fair and reasonable
amount that patients should be required to pay.  Part V provides recom-
mendations for protecting patients from surprise medical bills for emer-
gency ambulance services.  Part VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND: THE EMS PROBLEM
While some form of ambulance transportation has existed since an-
cient times, the development and success of cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion (CPR) in the late 1950s and early 1960s demonstrated that rapid
response of trained individuals could save lives.30  The turning point in
the United States from mere transportation to pre-hospital EMS and
trauma care came in the wake of a report published in 1966 titled, Acciden-
tal Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of Modern Society.31  This report,
commonly referred to as The White Paper, was prepared by the Committee
on Trauma and the Committee on Shock of the National Academy of Sci-
ences and published by the National Research Council.32  This report con-
cluded that the United States was “insensitive to the magnitude of the
problem of accidental death and injury.”33  The report noted the follow-
ing problems: inter alia, most ambulances were inappropriately designed,
cal Services: The Affordable Care Act, Government Insurers, Private Insurers and Uninsured
Patients, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 425 (2013) [hereinafter Nation, Determining]; George A.
Nation III, Healthcare and the Balance-Billing Problem: The Solution Is the Common Law
of Contracts and Strengthening the Free Market for Healthcare, 61 VILL. L. REV. 153
(2016) [hereinafter Nation, The Balance-Billing Problem]; George A. Nation III, Hos-
pital Chargemaster Insanity: Heeling the Healers, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 745 (2016) [hereinaf-
ter Nation, Chargemaster Insanity].
28. See infra notes 125–271 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 30–81 and accompanying text.
30. See RYAN CORBETT BELL, THE AMBULANCE: A HISTORY 228 (2009)
(“[I]nnovations in trauma care produced by two world wars convinced medical
profession that there were real gains in life-saving to be made . . . .”).
31. See id. at 249 (discussing this report).
32. See id.
33. See id. at 250.
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ill-equipped, and staffed with inadequately trained personnel.34  For ex-
ample, morticians were providing 50% of the nation’s ambulance ser-
vices.35  In most communities, morticians had the only vehicles designed
to transport someone lying down.  The report led to the design and imple-
mentation of the first federally qualified ambulance services and
personnel.36
The report recommended, inter alia, the state-level adoption of gen-
eral policies and regulations for ambulance services and the adoption at
the district, county, and municipal levels of ways and means of providing
ambulance service applicable to local conditions.37  This history explains
part of the reason why we have a patchwork of EMS systems across the
United States.38  The other part of the reason has to do with funding, or
more precisely the lack thereof.  Some initial uniformity was established as
a result of the passage of the Highway Safety Act of 1966, which created
the Department of Transportation (DOT).39  The DOT was given author-
ity over EMS and was charged with improving services by developing and
implementing standards with regard to provider training.40  States devel-
oped regional EMS systems and the Highway Safety Program paid for the
costs.41  Over the next twelve years, the DOT spent more than $142 mil-
lion on EMS system development.42
Through the 1970s, additional public funds were allocated to the de-
velopment of state-level EMS systems.43  In 1973, Title XII to the Public
Health Services Act, the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act of 1973
(EMS Act), provided an additional $300 million of funding for develop-
ment of regional EMS systems.44  By 1978, 304 EMS regions had been
identified, and the EMS Act identified various components that each sys-
tem should have.45
However, funding under the EMS Act essentially ended in 1981 with
the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.46  This law
consolidated EMS funding into preventative health and health services
block grants.  As a result, states gained greater flexibility and discretion in
34. See id.
35. See id. at 246–49.
36. See id. at 250.
37. See id. at 250–54.
38. See id.; see also id. at 227–42 (discussing fragmentation of ambulance ser-
vices leasing during Cold War and outrage of highway deaths).
39. See id. at 246.
40. See S. REP. NO. 89-1302 (1966); CONF. REP. 89-1920, at 1 (1966) (Conf.
Rep.); S. REP. NO. 89-1302, at 1–2.
41. See supra note 40.
42. See Robert R. Bass, History of EMS, in EMERGENCY MEDICAL OVERSIGHT:
CLINICAL PRACTICE AND SYSTEMS OVERSIGHT 3 (David C. Cone et al. eds., 2015).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 4.
45. See id. at 5.
46. See id. at 9.
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funding state EMS activities and regional EMS systems.47  Due to a lack of
funding that resulted from this law, many of the regional EMS manage-
ment entities established by federal funding ceased to operate.48
Both federal and state public funding for EMS systems remain spo-
radic.  For example, while most fire-related services provided by fire de-
partments are covered by property taxes, most publicly provided EMS
systems, even if provided by the fire department, are not paid for by prop-
erty taxes.49  As a result, while a homeowner will not receive a bill for a fire
truck coming to put out a fire, the homeowner will receive a bill if the fire
department sends an ambulance in response to an emergency.50  Today,
EMS systems are provided via a patchwork of different entities across the
country, and standards and methods of delivery are less than uniform.51
Over the last twenty or so years, the providing of EMS services and
systems has attracted huge amounts of private money as illustrated by the
2005 IPO of Emergency Medical Services, which is the parent of American
Medical Response (AMR), a for-profit company and the largest provider of
EMS systems in the country.52  Prior to the acquisition of AMR by Envision
Medical Services, AMR started to sell stock on the New York Stock Ex-
change and began a nationwide consolidation of the private ambulance
industry.53  More recently, further consolidation has occurred with the
previously number one and two providers, AMR and Rural/Metro respec-
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Think the ER Is Expensive? Look at How Much it Costs
to Get There, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/
health/think-the-er-was-expensive-look-at-the-ambulance-bill.html [https://
perma.cc/5VJM-9WFM] (“Fire departments, which don’t charge for driving to fire
alarms, do charge for ambulance runs.”); see also Pamela Wood, Baltimore County to
Charge for Ambulance Rides; Charge Could Raise $26M Annually, BALT. SUN (July 20,
2015, 7:49 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-coun
ty/towson/bs-md-co-ambulance-fees-20150720-story.html [https://perma.cc/
85ZP-83CA] (noting that across country it has become standard and acceptable for
fire departments to seek payment for ambulance and EMS services); Zamosky,
supra note 1 (noting common misconception that ambulance transportation and
paramedic service is paid for by tax dollars—fire services is but ambulance and
EMS services typically are not).
50. See, e.g., Rizzo v. City of Phila., 668 A.2d 236, 238 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995)
(rejecting suit brought by taxpayers alleging that EMS fees were unlawful
revenue-raising tax and holding charges were reasonable and lawfully imposed).
51. See, e.g., Zamosky, supra note 1 (noting that “operation and financing of
ambulance services are complicated and vary widely throughout the country” and
that “ambulance services are operated by any mix of volunteers, ambulance com-
panies, municipal EMS providers or fire departments”).
52. See EMS Completes IPO of 8.1M Shares, DENV. BUS. J. (Dec. 21, 2005, 04:36
PM), www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2005/12/19/daily40.html https://per
ma.cc/7M2W-A7ZS] (“Emergency Medical Services Corp. closed its initial public
offering of 8.1 million shares . . . at $14 per share.”).
53. See American Medical Response, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, www.fund
inguniverse.com/company-histories/american-medical-response-inc-history
[https://perma.cc/55VM-J5QX] (last visited Oct. 21, 2016) (discussing acquisition
by AMR and its initial public offering in August 1992).
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss4/4
2017] ADDRESSING AMBULANCE BILLS 755
tively, now combined under the AMR name and owned by Envision
Healthcare Holdings, a Fortune 500 publicly-traded company.54  In addi-
tion, international EMS provider Falck has established a large and growing
presence in the United States.  These events provide clear evidence that
EMS systems are big business with both public health and huge amounts
of money at stake.55
EMS systems are defined generally as the providing of out-of-hospital
acute medical care or transport to definitive care.56  The federal govern-
ment regulates EMS services at the most basic level by setting minimum
standards applicable to all EMS providers.57  However, EMS providers are
often regulated more strictly by state governments, which typically set
higher standards.58  In the United States, there are several different mod-
els that are used for providing EMS systems.59
54. See Dan Levine & Martha Graybow, Special Report: Dial 911-FOR-PROFIT—
Just Don’t Tell a Firehouse, REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2011, 01:04 PM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-ambulance/special-report-dial-911-for-profit-just-dont-tell-a-fire
house-idUSTRE73E3D720110415 [https://perma.cc/VBP7-BM5Z] (noting that
big investors are undaunted, and United States buyout shops are jumping into
EMS sector and that AMR’s (United States’ biggest private ambulance provider)
parent Emergency Medical Services Corp. (now Envision Healthcare Holdings)
and Rural/Metro Corp. (previously United States’ second biggest private ambu-
lance provider) both agreed to be purchased by private equity firms, Clayton
Dubilier & Rice and Warburg Pincus, respectively).  In 2015, Rural/Metro was pur-
chased by Envision, who now owns both AMR and Rural/Metro. See Envision
Healthcare Announces Closing of Rural/Metro Acquisition, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 28, 2015,
04:15 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151028006590/en/Envi
sion-Healthcare-Announces-Closing-RuralMetro-Acquisition [https://perma.cc/
NG3B-ZBQU].  Envison entered the Fortune 500 in 2016. See Audrey Shi, Here Are
the 15 New Companies Joining the Fortune 500, FORTUNE (June 6, 2016), http://for
tune.com/2016/06/06/fortune-500-companies-making-debuts/[https://perma.
cc/5GRY-TT6A].
55. See Levine & Graybow, supra note 54 (noting that “[i]n United States, esti-
mated 40 million ambulance trips a year are handled by public entities, private
providers, hospitals and volunteers” and that total spending on ambulance trips
each year is “at least 14 billion”).
56. See Nat’l EMS Res. Agenda, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (Dec.
31, 2001), www.nhtsa.gov/PEOPLE/INJURY/ems/ems-agenda/definition_of_ems
.htm [https://perma.cc/F28Q-YT5P] (defining “EMS”).
57. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NATIONAL EMS SCOPE OF PRAC-
TICE MODEL 5 (2007), www.ems.gov/education/EMSScope.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X6UK-FQL4] (noting concept of “freedom within limits” where there are na-
tional standards for personal licensure and minimum competencies while allowing
states to set more stringent standards).
58. See id. at 8–9.
59. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Services, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (Mar. 10, 2015),
https://www.transportation.gov/careers/veterans/emergency-medical-services
[https://perma.cc/S2G7-KV46] (noting that EMS personnel must be licensed by
state in which they work and each state has authority and responsibility to regulate
EMS within its borders).
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In many communities, EMS systems are municipally operated.60  Mu-
nicipally-based EMS systems may be provided in several different ways.  For
example, EMS systems may be provided by a local, regional, or state gov-
ernment, and may be funded by service fees, property taxes, or both.  If
the EMS system is too small to operate independently, it may be organized
as a branch of another municipal department, such as the fire depart-
ment.61  In communities without a large tax base, community volunteers
may provide EMS service.62  In these cases, the volunteer squad may re-
ceive some funding from municipal taxes but is generally heavily reliant
on voluntary donations to cover operating expenses.63  Many municipali-
ties provide EMS systems indirectly under a contractual agreement with a
private company, such as Envision’s AMR, Falck, or a hospital.64  This ap-
proach is often taken as a cost-saving measure for the local government.65
As noted, significant consolidation in the private ambulance market
has been occurring since the 1980s.  Today, the private market consists of
local ambulance companies, a few large regional companies, and a few
multinational companies that offer services in the United States.  Private
ambulance companies, both for-profit and nonprofit, typically operate ei-
ther on a fee-for-service basis charged to the patient, or by means of con-
tracts with local municipalities, which often also result in bills sent to
patients.66  In some cases private ambulance companies agree with local
governments that in exchange for exclusive contracts, the ambulance
company will provide high quality EMS systems including adequately
trained staff, sufficient available resources, and specific response times.67
Today, EMS services are provided by a combination of various public
providers (local, state, or regional) and private for-profit and nonprofit
providers such as hospitals and volunteers.68  Different private EMS prov-
60. See, e.g., Administration and Finance, CTY. OF MONTEREY HEALTH DEP’T
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.mtyhd.org/index.php/services/emergency-medical-
services/administration-and-finance__trashed/ [https://perma.cc/U64T-JVPT]
(noting that Monterey County, California, voters approved special tax in order to
fund EMS).
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., MONROE VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., www.monroeems.
org [https://perma.cc/SJ5C-L3G5] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
63. See id.
64. See PRINCIPLES OF EMS SYSTEMS 149–50 (John A. Brennan & Jon R.
Krohmer eds., 3d ed. 2005).
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Services, KERN CTY. PUB. HEALTH SERVS. DEP’T,
http://kernpublichealth.com/ems/ [https://perma.cc/JT9A-CTUL] (last visited
Oct. 25, 2016).
67. See, e.g., Ambulance Rates, KERN CTY. PUB. HEALTH SERVS. DEP’T, kernpub-
lichealth.com/ems-updates-news/ambulance/ [https://perma.cc/EZL2-8PJZ]
(last visited Oct. 25, 2016) (listing ambulance rates for their private providers, Hall
Ambulance, Delano Ambulance, and Liberty Ambulance and providing links to
Ambulance Performance standards).
68. See supra notes 56–65 and accompanying text.
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iders (both for-profit and non-profit), like hospitals, set their charges at
significantly different levels for the same services.69  Moreover, private
EMS providers, just like hospitals, accept significantly less than their in-
flated list prices as full payment for their services from government insur-
ers and private insurers with whom they have contracts.70  However, an
important difference between private EMS providers and hospitals is that
EMS providers overall have contracts with far fewer insurers.71  In fact, it is
not uncommon for EMS providers to have no contracts with any insur-
ers.72  In these cases, all privately insured patients are out-of-network and
subject to balance billing.  Thus, in the case of EMS providers, balance
billing is very common.  For example, Robin Spring of Corralitos, Califor-
nia, called 911 after becoming short of breath and was taken to the hospi-
tal in an ambulance.73  The bill she later received was for $2,288.74  The
ambulance was out-of-network and her insurance covered just $750.75  Ms.
Spring was responsible for the balance of $1,538.76  However, this was
completely unavoidable and predictable because there were no in-network
ambulance companies in Santa Cruz County where Ms. Spring lived.77  “It
made me furious,” she said.  “I thought, ‘[t]his is a real setup.’”78
Requiring patients who receive emergency ambulance service to pay
for the service is neither unfair nor unethical.  Moreover, as discussed in
the next section, the common law recognizes this fact through the doc-
trine of quasi-contract and application of the emergency medical care ex-
ception.  However, the problem arises in the case of emergency
ambulance service, just as it does in the case of hospital care, due to the
fact that many EMS providers, like many hospitals, are trying to collect an
exorbitant amount from privately insured out-of-network patients for the
services that they provide.79  Also, many EMS providers, again like hospi-
69. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 5–17 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 18 (“This Spring, Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Massachusetts launched a policy aimed at getting more emergency medical ser-
vices providers to join its network: It began sending checks for out-of-network pri-
vate ambulance rides directly to plan members rather than to the EMS
providers.”).
72. See, e.g., Zamosky, supra note 1 (“In Los Angeles and in many parts of the
country, emergency ambulance services—those that show up following a call to
911—don’t hold contracts with insurance companies, so there’s no point worrying
about whether you’re being picked up by an in-network provider.”).






79. See id. (“‘This . . . is really about whether individuals, families and employ-
ers should pay 80 to 100 million dollars a year because private out-of-network am-
bulance companies are allowed to charge rates that are three to five times above
what Medicare pays them for the very same service,’ says Jay McQuaide, a senior
vice president of corporate communications for BCBS of Massachusetts.”).  For a
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tals, use balance billing to demand full payment of their extreme list prices
from OON patients.  Many EMS providers, again like many hospitals, are
also quick to farm out uncollected bills to aggressive collection agencies
that often cause great financial and personal hardship for patients who
cannot pay the exorbitant bill.80  In essence, many EMS providers (also
like many hospitals) take advantage of vulnerable patients and use balance
billing to force these unfortunate patients to pay excessive rates for emer-
gency ambulance service.81
III. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO PAY FOR EMERGENCY
AMBULANCE SERVICE
In the case of emergency ambulance service, an ambulance com-
pany’s right to recover payment from the patient is based on the doctrine
of quasi-contract, which is also known as an implied-in-law contract or an
action for unjust enrichment (“quantum meruit” in Latin, meaning
roughly “as much as he deserves” or “what one has earned”).82  Notwith-
standing the fact that the term “contract” is often used to describe this sort
of claim, there is no actual contract between the parties.83  Contract law is
the law of voluntary agreements and requires the voluntary and knowing
agreement of the parties.84  Contracts may be either express or implied,
that is, stated in words or based on actions, but in both cases, the require-
ment of a voluntary and knowing agreement remains.85  Of course, in the
discussion of the same issues in the context of hospital billing, see generally Na-
tion, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 27; Nation, Determining, supra note 27; Na-
tion, The Balance-Billing Problem, supra note 27.
80. See, e.g., Anna Gorman, After the Ambulance Ride to the Hospital Comes the
Pain of the Bills, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Jan. 31, 2016, 08:02 AM), http://www.oc
register.com/articles/city-701817-gurzi-bill.html [https://perma.cc/VEC9-6YAW]
(“[T]he city of La Habra California sent [an eighty-five year old] a $260 bill for
‘paramedic response’—after her insurers already had been billed and paid for the
November ambulance ride. . . .  One city employee threatened to send her to col-
lections, warning she wouldn’t ever be able to get a loan.”); Dan Mangan, Medical
Bills Are the Biggest Causes of US Bankruptcies: Study, CNBC (June 25, 2013, 2:29 PM),
www.cnbc.com/id/100840148 [https://perma.cc/K84U-833H] (noting that un-
paid medical bills are number one cause of bankruptcy filings).
81. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Hailey v. Med. Corp., Inc., No. L-05-1238, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS
4706, at *2, *18 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2006).  Hailey, the plaintiff, was trans-
ported via ambulance to a hospital following a car accident and billed $961.
Hailey refused to pay the bill because she believed it to be unreasonable and was
sued by the collection agency to which the provider had sold the account.  The
court noted that the case involves an implied-in-law contract or a quasi-contract,
not a true contract. See id. at *9.
83. See id. at *8–9.  The court noted that there was no contract between the
parties on these facts because a true contract requires a meeting of the minds as to
the essential terms of the agreement. See id.
84. See id. at *9.
85. See id.; see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 1-12, at 19–20 (3d ed. 1977) (discussing implied-in-fact, express contracts,
and implied-in-law or quasi-contract).
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case of emergency ambulance or other emergency medical services, the
patient is in no position to agree and often does not even know at the time
the services are provided that they are being provided.  As a result, there is
no contract to be enforced.  The parties have never agreed on any of the
terms under which the services have been provided, including the price.
The ambulance company cannot claim that the patient has agreed to pay a
certain price for the services received.  The patient has agreed to nothing.
However, the law recognizes that, in the case of necessary emergency
ambulance services or other emergency medical services, a reasonable per-
son would desire such services and justice is served by requiring the pa-
tient to pay the fair value of the services received.86  In the context of
emergency medical services, a patient receiving such services would be un-
justly enriched unless the patient is required to pay the provider the fair
value of the service received.87  As a result, the law imposes an obligation
on patients who receive emergency medical services, including emergency
ambulance services, to pay the fair value of such services to the provider.88
The courts’ imposition of this obligation prevents an unjust enrichment.89
Moreover, the law’s recognition of this quasi-contractual obligation serves
the important public policy of encouraging such services to be provided
when needed.90  The word “contract” is associated with this obligation as a
result of now obsolete pleading requirements, not because there is any
real agreement or true contract between the parties.91
Because there is no real contract between the parties, the parties have
not agreed on the value of the services provided and the court must deter-
86. See Hailey, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4706, at *9 (noting that quasi-contracts
are legal fictions that create obligations based on equitable principles).  The court
states: “[A] recipient of emergency medical services may be held liable to the
health care provider pursuant to an implied-in-law contract or quasi-contract for
the reasonable value of those services.” See id. at *9–10 (citation omitted).
87. See id. at *10 (“One who is severely injured or ill such that he or she be-
comes unconscious and unable to seek or decline medical services is in need of the
protection and assistance such a rule of law offers him.  By imposing liability upon
him, the law seeks to ensure that he will be provided the necessary services to save
his life.  Faced with the choice of forcing [the person who was served] to pay the
reasonable value of the services he received or forcing those who render emer-
gency medical services in cases such as this to risk doing so as a matter of charity,
we must choose the former.  Accordingly, [the person who was served] may be
held liable in quasi-contract for the reasonable value of the services received by
him.” (quoting Morehead v. Conley, 599 N.E.2d 786, 788–89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(alteration in original))).
88. See id at *18.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 85,  § 1–12, at 20 (“The quasi-contrac-
tual label arose from a procedural quirk.  Since in the earlier law there was no writ
for an obligation of this kind, courts permitted the use of the contractual writ of
assumpsit and allowed the plaintiff’s attorney to plead a fictitious promise.  The
crux is that a quasi-contract is not a peculiar brand of contract.  It is a non-contrac-
tual obligation that used to be treated procedurally as if it were a contract.” (em-
phasis added)).
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mine the fair value of the services.92  The problem that has occurred gen-
erally in health care, including emergency ambulance services, is that
courts, in determining fair value, have traditionally relied on the usual and
customary amount billed by the provider as a proxy for fair value.93  How-
ever, courts are beginning to understand that this is a mistake, because in
the context of health care, the odd dynamics of the third-party-payer sys-
tem and a lack of meaningful retail-level competition have caused the
amount usually and customarily billed (also referred to as “full charges,”
“list prices,” and “chargemaster rates or prices”) by providers to greatly
exceed the amount that is usually and customarily paid to and accepted by
providers as full payment.94  That is, the amount billed is typically grossly
overstated and greatly exceeds the fair value of the services provided be-
cause this price is set to be discounted by third-party payers and not
paid.95  The amount usually and customarily paid to the provider is a
much better measure of fair value for health care than is the amount usu-
ally and customarily charged or billed by the provider.96
Moreover, there is very little consistency between ambulance compa-
nies with regard to the rates that they charge.97  In general, ambulance
companies have complete discretion in setting their list prices.98  Again,
this is very similar to the situation with hospitals.  Hospitals also charge
vastly different amounts for the same procedure.99  Hospitals also have
complete discretion with regard to setting their billed charges and also use
92. See Hailey, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4706, at *10–11 (“The reasonable value
of the services must be demonstrated at trial by competent, credible evidence.  The
party asserting a claim in quantum meruit bears the burden of proof.  A defending
party may raise the issues of the necessity and value of the emergency medical
services as a defense to the provider’s claim of nonpayment.” (citations omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Holland v. Trinity Health Care Corp., 791 N.W.2d 724, 729–30
(Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (finding chargemaster rates are usual and customary).
94. See, e.g., Nation, The Balance-Billing Problem, supra note 27, at 153 (“Courts
across the country are beginning to understand that hospital bills based on list or
chargemaster prices are excessive and unfair, because they reflect prices that are
set to be discounted and not paid.”).
95. See id.
96. See id. at 187 (arguing that courts should reject usual, customary, and nec-
essary as proxy for fair and reasonable value and substitute usual and customary
amount provider is actually paid for services); see also infra notes 112–14 and ac-
companying text that notes the same dilemma applies to ambulance charges with
ambulance providers in Minnesota collecting only between $.42 and $.65 of each
dollar billed.
97. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 49 (noting that ambulance “charges as well
as insurance coverage, range widely, from zero to tens of thousands of dollars”).
98. See id. (“Part of the inconsistency in pricing stems from the fact that ambu-
lance services are variously run by fire departments, hospitals, private companies,
and volunteer groups.”).
99. See, e.g., Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 27, at 747, 755 (noting
“no two hospitals necessarily charge the same amount for the same services” and
noting that hospital list prices are “arbitrary and capricious from the point of view
of pricing except in one respect—the higher the list price, the higher the hospi-
tal’s revenue”).
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that discretion to maximize profits.100  In many cases, billed charges are
set by ambulance companies to maximize profits under the odd and often
counterintuitive context of various third-party reimbursement schemes.101
In addition, as a result of these third-party reimbursement schemes, the
same ambulance company, like the same hospital, will be paid vastly differ-
ent amounts depending on the identity of the third-party payer.102  In the
hospital context, as I have written about before, the majority of the imme-
diate unfairness of this system is experienced by self-pay patients (the un-
insured and those subject to balance billing).103  In the long run, however,
everyone suffers because this system leads to ever-higher health care
costs.104
In one sense, the problem with regard to emergency ambulance bills
is even worse than the problem of exorbitant hospital bills because a
higher number of patients are subject to balance billing in the ambulance
context due to the fact that ambulance companies tend to contract with
fewer, if any, insurers.105  Thus, a large number of patients that receive
emergency ambulance service are subject to balance bills.  Also, the bal-
ance bills for emergency ground ambulance services, while exorbitant, are
more likely to be within the ability of the patient to pay and therefore are
more likely to generate profits for the ambulance company.  For example,
in the hospital context, if a patient receives a $100,000 or higher bill from
the hospital, it is often simply impossible for the patient to pay it.  How-
ever, in the emergency ambulance service context, even an unconsciona-
bly high ambulance bill of $2,700 or $5,700 can, often with extreme
difficulty, be paid by a much larger number of patients.  Moreover, for
many patients, it comes down to a choice of either paying the bill, suffer-
100. See id. at 760 (“The single most important reason that chargemaster rates
remain so high is that competitive forces in the healthcare market have broken
down, and as a result, many hospitals may raise their chargemaster rates with impu-
nity.  Moreover, such rate increases are associated with increases, albeit much
smaller ones, in revenues.  Finally, hospitals currently have absolutely no reason to
reduce their chargemaster rates—that is, they suffer no competitive disadvantage
by setting their rates ever higher.” (citations omitted)).
101. See Rosenthal, supra note 49 (noting that emergency dispatchers decide
which ambulance to send based on geographic proximity and “[m]ost ambulance
companies bill according to the level of the skill of the team on board, rather than
the medical needs of the patients they collect”).
102. See, e.g., Medearis, supra note 10 (“Many Americans with good insurance
will not be overburdened by their ambulance bills.  Medicare patients who meet
their deductible typically pay 20% of the amount quoted by Medicare.  Insured
patients who take an in-network ambulance usually pay a fraction of the negotiated
amount as well.  But the system fails people who happen to take an out-of-network
ambulance or don’t have insurance.  In that case, the provider is free to charge any
amount it sees fit, and the bills are often steep.”).
103. See Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 27, at 761–66 (discussing
how exorbitant list prices are unfair and even cruel to self-pay patients).
104. See id. at 766–69 (discussing how inflated list prices cause higher overall
prices for health care).
105. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
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ing a damaged credit rating, or paying the cost of hiring an attorney to
contest the charge.106  For many patients, the efficient choice is simply to
pay the unreasonable bill.107  Many ambulance companies take advantage
of this situation.108  As Robin Spring said, “this is a real set up.”109
In 2015, Kevin Miller, president of the Minnesota Ambulance Associa-
tion noted that the Association had previously done a survey of its mem-
bers and “found fees ranging from $450 to almost $1,900 for basic life
support—the lowest level of emergency medical service.”110  Allina Health
Ambulance operates one of the largest ambulance service providers in
Minnesota and charges up to $1,900 for a typical ambulance ride.111  Mr.
Miller also notes that the fees charged are often subject to deep discounts
depending on the patient’s insurance.112  In other words, the amount
paid and accepted by providers as full payment is significantly different
than the amount billed.113  According to Mr. Miller, in 2015 across the
state of Minnesota, ambulance providers collected anywhere between $.42
and $.65 for each dollar billed.114
Many ambulance companies also engage in aggressive billing, as do
many hospitals.  For example, in 2006, Kim Nuxoll was pregnant and at
home with her husband when she realized the baby was coming very
quickly.115  She called 911, hoping “she could give birth in the hospital as
planned, but her son arrived even faster” than the St. Paul Fire Depart-
106. See Andrews, supra note 18 recounting the following:
Negotiating for an in-network rate can often reduce the bill from an
out-of-network provider by 30 to 35 percent, says Candice Butcher, presi-
dent and chief executive of Medical Billing Advocates of America.
Sometimes plan members don’t realize they may have options.  Ma-
ria and Gerald Kinghorn got an $800 bill from the ambulance company
that transported their 19-year-old son to the hospital a few miles away
after he crashed on the interstate near their Utah home and knocked out
four teeth.  Even though their bill was almost half of the total $1,700
charge—their automobile and health insurers had paid the rest—they
paid it.
“We didn’t want to have our credit ruined for $800,” says Maria
Kinghorn, who says the ambulance company put some pressure on them
to pay up.  In hindsight, though, “I probably should have checked it and
fought it,” she says.
Andrews, supra note 18.
107. See id.
108. See id; see also infra notes 114–18 and accompanying text discussing an
ambulance company who was called to assist a woman delivering a baby but arrived
after the child was born, transported mother and baby to be examined and
charged double—once for the mother and again for the baby.
109. See Andrews, supra note 18.
110. See Gilbert, supra note 8.
111. See id. (noting that ambulance crews usually “don’t mention fees” and
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ment that provided the ambulance service.116  “Both mother and the baby
seemed fine, but they still needed to be checked out by a doctor.”117
When the paramedics offered to take them to the hospital, Mrs. Nuxoll
agreed.118  Sometime later, she found out that the St. Paul Fire Depart-
ment charged a total of $2,306 for the ride; $1,153 for Mrs. Nuxoll and
another $1,153 for the baby!119
According to one commentator, the uninsured and those with high
deductible insurance are usually the type of self-pay patient hit with high
charges, but in the case of ambulance services, high charges can also hit
people with more conventional health insurance.120  “Patients who have
insurance and means, but use an out-of-network provider, face the highest
out-of-pocket costs.”121  Recall that in the context of emergency ambu-
lance services, the patient usually has no control over which ambulance
service is used.122  Thus, whether the service used is in or out-of-network is
purely up to chance.123  Jay Fitch, the president of Fitch and Associates,
the largest emergency medical services consulting firm in the United
States, notes that ambulance companies typically collect only 30% to 40%
of the amount they bill, and “they often try to charge more for patients
with insurance and those who can pay.”124
IV. DETERMINING THE FAIR AND REASONABLE VALUE OF EMERGENCY
AMBULANCE SERVICE
A. The Cost of Providing Emergency Ambulance Service
The cost of providing emergency ambulance service varies greatly for
different providers due to both the fact that there are many different types
of entities that provide EMS services, and to the nature of emergency am-
bulance services.125  The nature of emergency ambulance service requires




119. See id. (noting that ambulance provider even charged twice for mileage).
120. See Medearis, supra note 10 (noting “[m]any Americans with good insur-
ance will not be overburdened by their ambulance bills,” but also noting that “am-
bulance providers often avoid negotiating contracts with insurance companies or
charge out-of-network individuals significantly higher rates”).
121. Id. (“[T]he system fails people who happen to take out-of-network ambu-
lance or don’t have insurance.  In that case, the provider is free to charge any
amount it sees fit, and the bills are often steep.”).
122. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
124. See Rosenthal, supra note 49.
125. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-6, AMBULANCE
PROVIDERS: COSTS AND MEDICARE MARGINS VARIED WIDELY; TRANSPORTS OF BENEFI-
CIARIES HAVE INCREASED (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22D6-KC9M] [hereinafter GAO AMBULANCE REPORT].
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days a week.126  This creates a very large fixed cost that is known in the
industry as the “cost of readiness.”127  Providers that deliver a relatively
large number of emergency service calls can spread that fixed cost of read-
iness over all of its service calls and, as a result, will have a much lower cost
per call than a provider that provides a significantly lower number of
emergency service calls.128
In addition to the volume of transports, important cost drivers are the
intensity of the transports—that is, the number that are emergency as op-
posed to nonemergency transports and the relative intensity of the emer-
gency transports (BLS, ALS 1, ALS 2)—and the level of government
subsidies that a provider receives.129  Volume of transport is inversely re-
lated to cost per transport; that is, the larger the number of transports, the
lower the cost per transport due to the high fixed cost of readiness.  Inten-
sity of service is positively correlated with cost per transport.130  That is, it
is more expensive to provide emergency service than nonemergency ser-
vice and more expensive to provide ALS than BLS service.131  Finally, the
level of government subsidies is also positively related to cost per trans-
port; the higher the government subsidy received by a provider, the
higher the provider’s cost.132  It is suggested that this is because such prov-
iders have less pressure to keep their costs under control.133
B. Value Models
There are a number of different ways to calculate the reasonable
value of emergency ambulance services.  For example, value can be based
on the cost to provide the service, the Medicare reimbursement rate, or
the private insurance company reimbursement rate.  If the determination
of value were based on cost, then a reasonable profit would need to be
added to determine fair and reasonable value.134  Another possible ap-
proach, although not a good one in the case of emergency ambulance
services or other medical services, is to use usual and customary charges of
providers in the geographic area where the services in question were pro-
vided as a basis for determining reasonable value.135  This latter method—
126. See id. at 9–18.
127. See id.





133. See id. at 25.
134. It is not reasonable to expect services or products to be supplied at a loss
to the provider.  However, a cost-based approach lacks the discipline of competi-
tive markets and is likely to result in inefficiencies. See supra notes 132–33 and
accompanying text.
135. Charges are set solely by the provider, and the lack of any consumer-level
price competition results in grossly inflated prices. See supra notes 14–19 and ac-
companying text.
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the charge-based method—is the one preferred by providers because it
establishes the highest value.136  The problem is that the value is too high
and is not reasonable.137
1. Usual and Customary Charges
Traditionally, as noted above, when courts were required to deter-
mine the fair and reasonable value of emergency medical services for pur-
poses of applying the doctrine of quasi-contract, they often equated
reasonable value with the usual and customary charges common for such
services in the area where the services were provided.138  Given this his-
tory, it is important to explain why the usual and customary charge-based
method is no longer valid for determining the fair and reasonable value of
emergency ambulance or other medical services.
Necessary to this discussion is an understanding of the various labels
commonly used to refer to different types of prices and amounts paid for
medical care.  For example, “charges” are also known as “full charges,”
“billed charges,” “list prices,” or “chargemaster rates,” and represent the
highest price for the services in question, similar to the MSRP for a new
car.139  These terms should be distinguished from the amounts paid by
in-network insurance companies, which are referred to as “negotiated
rates,” “negotiated charges,” or “discounted charges” (to continue the car
analogy, these terms would represent the amount most people actually pay
for the new car, although the discount off of list price for medical care is
many times greater than for the typical new car), and the amounts paid by
government insurers such as Medicare and Medicaid (these prices are set
unilaterally by the government).140  The most common reference con-
cerning government-set rates is to the “Medicare rate.”141
As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, as a result of the third-party
reimbursement system for medical care, including emergency ambulance
service, charges became anchoring points for either negotiating discounts
with various third-party payers or for gaming the Medicare reimbursement
system.142  Eventually, neither Medicare nor private insurers used billed
charges to directly determine reimbursement rates.143  However, by that
time charges were already grossly inflated, and they have since continued
to be increased frequently and excessively.144  This becomes very obvious
when charges are compared with actual reimbursements.145  That is,
136. See supra notes 92–104 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 138–53 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 82–124 and accompanying text.
139. See Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 27, at 746–50.
140. See id. at 750–60.
141. See id. at 778 (discussing Medicare and Medicaid rates).
142. See id. at 766–69.
143. See id. (noting that chargemaster rates are still indirectly relevant).
144. See id. at 750–60.
145. See id; supra notes 105–24 and accompanying text.
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throughout health care and including emergency ambulance services, ac-
tual reimbursement amounts are only a fraction of billed charges.146  In
other words, while historically charges were a good proxy for actual reim-
bursements, that is no longer the case today.  The amount actually paid to
providers today is significantly lower than the amount charged by
providers.147
Today, for a variety of reasons (that I have discussed in detail in other
articles and do not wish to repeat here)148 billed charges remain excessive
because they ultimately lead to higher third-party reimbursement rates, or
at least have that potential.149  Moreover, extreme charges carry no down-
side for the providers because there is very little price competition at the
consumer level for health care150 and none whatsoever with respect to
emergency health care and emergency ambulance services.151  Charges
are solely within the control of providers and, due to the absence of price
competition at the consumer level, there is no market constraint on prov-
iders’ ability to set charges oppressive levels.152  Moreover, the process
used by providers for setting charges is so heavily influenced by the oddi-
ties of the third-party reimbursement system that the charges themselves
are arbitrary and capricious from a fair value point of view.153  As a result,
charges should not be used in any way in the determination of fair and
reasonable value.
A contemporary approach that would be equivalent to the traditional
approach of basing fair value on usual and customary charges would be to
base fair value on the usual and customary reimbursement amount actu-
ally received by the provider for the services in question.154  In other
words, the reasonable value of the services provided is equal to the average
amount that the provider actually receives as reimbursement for such ser-
vices.155  This, in my opinion, is the best method for determining the fair
and reasonable value of emergency medical services.  However, in the case
of emergency ambulance services, data regarding actual reimbursements
146. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
147. Cf. Temple Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.2d
501, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (chargemaster rate “bears no relationship to the
amount typically paid for those services”).
148. See supra note 27.
149. See Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 27, at 766–69.
150. See id. at 750–60.
151. See supra notes 8–17 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
153. See id. (noting that patients who have insurance and means, but use an
out-of-network provider (something over which they have no choice) pay most, not
for better service, but simply because of the way the billing and reimbursement
system works).
154. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 110–23 and accompanying text.
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is limited, and, as a result, it is necessary to look for other measures that
can be independently verified, such as those discussed below.156
2. Medicare Reimbursement Rates
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) pays for am-
bulance services furnished to patients with Medicare insurance when
other forms of transportation would be unacceptable due to the patient’s
medical condition.157  Generally, ambulance services are paid according
to CMS’s Ambulance Fee Schedule (AFS).158  CMS reimburses for emer-
gency and nonemergency ground ambulance transportation as well as for
air ambulance transportation.159  My focus in this Article is on ground
emergency ambulance charges, although, as noted above, the principles
governing this discussion are also applicable to emergency air ambulance
charges and emergency medical care in general.160
Two components go into establishing fees for ground-based ambu-
lance service under the AFS.  The two components are a base payment,161
discussed further below, and a separate payment for mileage.162  Under
the AFS, fee determination begins with a set dollar amount, which for the
year 2015 was $221.63.163  This dollar amount is then adjusted to reflect
both the intensity of service (emergency versus nonemergency) and re-
gional differences in the cost of providing service.164
In 2015, for example, (BLS) emergency service had an intensity of
service factor of 1.60, level 1 Advanced Life Support emergency (ALS 1)
had an intensity factor of 1.90, and level 2 Advanced Life Support emer-
gency (ALS 2) had an intensity factor of 2.75.165  A geographic adjustment
factor (GAF) is then used to account for “geographic differences in the
156. See, e.g., supra notes 124–32 and accompanying text.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 1861(s)(7) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 410.40(d) (2013).
158. For information regarding the AFS, see 42 U.S.C. § 410(B); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1834(1); 42 C.F.R. § 414(H); CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDI-
CARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL CHAPTER 15 (2016); CENTER FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL CHAPTER 10 (2016).
159. See CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE BENEFIT POL-
ICY MANUAL CHAPTER 10 (2016).
160. See supra note 4.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, AMBULANCE SERVICES PAYMENT




165. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: EVALUA-
TIONS OF HOSPITALS’ AMBULANCE DATA ON MEDICARE COST REPORTS AND FEASIBILITY
OF OBTAINING COST DATA FROM ALL AMBULANCE PROVIDERS AND SUPPLIERS 11
(2015) https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/ambu
lancefees/schedule/downloads/Report-To-Congress-September-2015.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/5S98-JBLU] [hereinafter HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS].
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cost of providing ambulance services.”166  The GAF is based on the
non-facility practice expense (PE) component of the geographic practice
cost index (GPCI).167  The PE GPCI is designed to account for geographic
variation in the price of physician services.168  “There are currently 89 dif-
ferent localities defined by CMS.”169  The ZIP Code in which the Medicare
insured patient is picked up by the ambulance establishes which localities
PE GPCI is applied to determine the base payment.170  The PE GPCI is
applied only to the labor-related portion of the ambulance service.171  For
ground transports, this portion is 70% of the base payment; the remaining
30% of the base payment is unmodified by the GAF.172
The mileage payment component of the AFS is determined by multi-
plying loaded miles by the mileage rate.173  Loaded miles are the miles the
ambulance travels with the patient on-board from the point-of-pick-up to
the appropriate facility.174  Finally, the AFS also incorporates two perma-
nent add-on payments for transports that originate in rural areas—one for
ground transports and one for air transports.175  The standard mileage
rate is increased by 50% for the first seventeen miles for ground ambu-
lance transports that originate in a rural ZIP Code.176  There are also
three temporary add-on payments that are in force until December 31,
2017.177  These temporary policies increase rural ground billing payments
by 3% of both the base payment and the mileage rate if the
point-of-pickup is rural, by 2% if the point-of-pickup is urban, and by
22.6% if the point-of-pickup is considered super-rural.178
“Medicare paid approximately $5.3 billion to over 11,000 entities for
ambulance services in 2011.”179  “According to the Medicare Payment Ad-
visory Commission (MedPAC), ambulance service use per [patient or]
beneficiary, Medicare spending on ambulance services, and the volume of
Medicare-participating ambulance entities all increased between 2007 and
2011.”180  It is important to note that Medicare requires participating am-
bulance service providers to accept the Medicare-allowed charge, based on
the AFS, as payment in full and to not bill or collect from the beneficiary




169. Id. at 11 n.17.





175. See id. at 13.
176. See id. at 13 tbl. 2.3: Add-On Payments to the AFS.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 9.
180. Id.
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss4/4
2017] ADDRESSING AMBULANCE BILLS 769
surance amounts.181  In other words, ambulance service providers are pro-
hibited from balance billing patients for the difference between the
provider’s charge and the AFS-based payment from Medicare.182
An important question in the context of this Article is whether Medi-
care rates should be used to determine the fair and reasonable value of
emergency ambulance services.  To see how much Medicare pays under
the AFS, consider the following example.  As an illustration, I have as-
sumed a ten-mile emergency ambulance trip in 2015 in the Philadelphia
metropolitan area. Medicare’s reimbursement for this hypothetical trip
would be between $450 and $681.183  The range reflects various intensity
levels of emergency service.184  That is, BLS service would be reimbursed
at about $450, ALS 1 service (most emergency transports fall into this cate-
gory)185 is paid at about $518, and ALS 2 at about $681.186  These num-
bers include a mileage reimbursement of $71.30 for the ten-mile trip.
That is, for 2015, Medicare’s base rate for mileage was $7.13 per
fully-loaded mile.187
While data for the industry is limited, in 2012 a report from the Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) found that in 2010, the median cost per
transport for ground ambulance service providers was $429, but the range
was from a low of $224 per transport to a high of $2,204 per transport.188
The median cost was for all transports and was not broken out between
emergency and nonemergency transports.189  The GAO report also found
that the median Medicare margin, including add-on payments, was about
+2% in 2010.190  That is, providers’ Medicare payments per transport ex-
ceeded their overall costs per transport by 2%.191  However, just as in the
case of costs per transport, margins varied widely for those providers.192
Median Medicare margins with add-on payments ranged from about -2%
to +9%.193  As a comparison, the hypothetical trip discussed in the previ-
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 1834(1) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 410.40(a) (2012) (requiring
mandatory assignment for all ambulance services, meaning that ambulance provid-
ers and suppliers must accept Medicare-allowed charges as payment in full and not
bill or collect from beneficiary any amount other than any unmet Part B deducti-
ble and Part B coinsurance amounts).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 1834(1); 42 C.F.R. § 410.40(a).
183. See HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 164, at 10–11.
184. See id.
185. See GAO AMBULANCE REPORT, supra note 124, at 33.
186. See HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 164, at 10–11.
187. See id.
188. See GAO AMBULANCE REPORT, supra note 124, at 10.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 18.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 22.
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ous paragraph would have been paid by Medicare at 2010 rates at about
$431 for BLS, $498 for ALS 1, and $692 for ALS 2.194
How do Medicare rates measure up to the industry?  Again, data for
the industry is limited, but in looking at anecdotal information, it seems
that ambulance companies are often playing the same games as those re-
sponsible for hospital billing.  The game is: How high can we set our rates?
For example, an industry newsletter from Comstar Ambulance Billing Ser-
vice states: “A question I routinely receive from clients is, ‘how high can I
set my rates?’”195  The newsletter goes on to provide the following advice:
There is no appropriate definitive answer to this question.  The
OIG guidance on this matter is to set rates to cover your
costs . . . . False.  One thing I can do is provide general informa-
tion on the rate setting patterns of Comstar’s 200+ municipal cli-
ent base.  To that end, I have analyzed the current ambulance
billing rates set by Comstar’s clients.  Below is the average rates





Mileage $32.13 per loaded mile[.]
Please note, Comstar is successfully billing and collecting the
fees set by highest 50 Comstar clients in full (less applicable
co-pays . . .) without issue from non-contracted insurance
carriers.
If your current rates are above the averages above, you do
not have an issue.  If your rates are below the averages above,
you have a potential opportunity for revenue increase.196
I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the information quoted above, but it
certainly does illustrate a mindset consistent with the way in which hospital
chargemaster rates are set, and it also illustrates why charges cannot be
used as a basis for determining the fair and reasonable value of emergency
ambulance services.  The Medicare rates certainly provide a better starting
point for determining fair and reasonable value.
3. Private Insurance Reimbursement Rates
With regard to private insurance, there are two issues that affect reim-
bursement for ambulance services.  The first is whether the ambulance
194. See supra notes 157–87 and accompanying text for an explanation of how
to calculate AFS reimbursements.
195. See Rick Martin, CMS Ambulance Fee Schedule Update, COMSTAR AMBULANCE
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services received are covered.197  This typically depends on whether the
insurance company determines that it was necessary.198  In the case of
emergency ambulance services, this is not usually a concern and is not my
focus here.199  The second issue concerns the amount that the insurer will
pay for the ambulance services provided to the insured.
In general, in-network insurance companies pay more than the Medi-
care rate but less, often much less, than the amount charged by the provid-
ers.200  The amount paid by in-network insurance companies is negotiated
between the provider and the company and set forth in the contract be-
tween them, which also typically states that the provider will accept the
insurance company’s reimbursement as payment in full and prohibits the
provider from balance billing patients insured by that insurer.
In the case of emergency ambulance services provided by an
out-of-network company, some private insurers will reimburse the
out-of-network provider at the in-network rate but may pay less.201  The
reason that receiving service from an out-of-network provider is so signifi-
cant is that out-of-network providers have not agreed with the insurance
company to accept the insurance company’s reimbursement as payment in
full.202  Thus, in these cases the provider is free to bill the patient for the
difference between the amount paid by the insurance company and the
full charges billed by the provider; that is, the balance owing after the
insurance company has made payment.203  This sets the stage for balance
billing of patients insured by out-of-network insurers.204
197. See, e.g., Zamosky, supra note 1 (noting that both Medicare and private
insurance generally cover cost of ambulance rides, but they rely on medical neces-
sity when determining reimbursement).
198. See id. (“Ambulance trips are considered medically necessary in cases of
sudden emergency . . . .”).
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 18 (citing Robert E. O’Connor, chair of
Department of Emergency Medicine at University of Virginia School of Medicine,
as saying that sometimes in-network reimbursements are just 50% of provider’s
charges (list prices) and recounting example of patient whose insurance covered
in-network emergency ambulance bills at 80% of charges, but coverage for
out-of-network provider maxed out at $750).  The patient’s ambulance bill was
$2,288. See id.
201. See id.
202. In the case of government insurers Medicare or Medicaid, for example,
providers are required to accept the payment as payment in full and are prohib-
ited from balance billing.  See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
203. Balance-billing refers to billing the insured but out-of-network patient
directly for the difference between the provider’s charges and the insurance reim-
bursement.  For example, in the case mentioned in above, the patient was billed
for the difference between the $2,288 of charges and the insurance companies’
reimbursement of $750; the patient was billed $1,538. See supra note 199.
204. For a discussion of balance-billing in the health care context, see gener-
ally Nation, Healthcare and the Balance Billing Problem, supra note 27.
25
Nation: Taking Advantage of Patients in an Emergency: Addressing Exorbita
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
772 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 747
Private insurance reimbursement rates, like the charges of ambulance
companies, vary greatly from one insurer to another.205  Moreover,
“‘There are significant numbers of patients who have no coverage for this,
and the number of self-pay patients has climbed’ since the recession, said
Jay Fitch, president of Fitch and Associates, the largest emergency medical
services consulting firm in the United States.”206  In addition, Mr. Fitch
notes that ambulance companies typically collect only 30% to 40% of the
amount they bill,207 and as a result, they often try to charge more for pa-
tients with insurance and those who can pay.208  This is why many ambu-
lance companies find it profitable to refuse to go in-network with any
insurance companies.209  That is, by being out-of-network, they can bal-
ance bill all of their patients except those that are covered by Medicare.210
As noted above, ambulance services are variously provided by fire depart-
ments, hospitals, private companies, and volunteer groups, which contrib-
ute to the inconsistent pricing.211  Also, while some providers are included
in insurance networks, others are not.  “ ‘There’s a saying that if you’ve
seen one emergency medical system, you’ve seen one emergency medical
system—no two are alike,’ said Dr. Robert E. O’Connor, a vice president
of the American College of Emergency Medicine and chairman of the de-
partment at the University of Virginia.”212  According to O’Connor,
charges and payments “are all over the place.”213
Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), qualified health insurance pol-
icies are required to include some coverage for emergency care, including
ambulance services, as an essential benefit.214  However, the ACA does not
prevent balance billing by out-of-network providers.215  In addition, even
if the patient is lucky and an in-network provider happens to have been
called by the 911 dispatcher, “the ambulance ride and the care are billed
separately.”216  As a result, lower-tier plans under the ACA often require
205. See Rosenthal, supra note 49, (quoting Robert E. O’Connor’s observation
that charges for ambulance services “are all over the place”).
206. Id.
207. See id.  As discussed supra, this statistic can be interpreted in a variety of
ways.  The interpretation that I think is most often correct is that these low collec-
tion rates are an indication of excessive pricing.  That is, the level of billed charges
is completely within the discretion of the provider, and the provider’s ability to go
after patients via balance-billing for that exorbitant balance is an incentive to set
prices at unreasonably high levels.
208. See id.
209. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
210. See id.




215. See Nation, Healthcare and the Balance Billing Problem, supra note 27, at
165–67 (noting that in fact ACA encourages balance billing).
216. See Rosenthal, supra note 49.
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patients to pay an initial copay of $250 for the emergency room and $250
more for the transport.217
Insurance reimbursements are often based on Medicare’s Ambulance
Fee Schedule.218  However, the range is broad with some insurers reim-
bursing more or less than the applicable AFS amount.219  As discussed
above, the average Medicare payment is just 2% more than the median
provider cost per transport.220  This means that many providers fail to
fully recover their costs and in fact lose money transporting Medicare
patients.221
Providers may also be losing money or just about breaking even on
their in-network insurance reimbursements, although that seems very un-
likely.  According to O’Connor, in-network reimbursements often cover
just 50% of charges.222  However, I must observe that ambulance providers
voluntarily enter into contracts with in-network insurers, and it seems very
unlikely that they would agree to reimbursements that were unprofitable
for them.  Also, some studies have indicated that the profit margin for the
ambulance industry overall is about 7.5%.223  This suggests that the reason
reimbursements often cover just 50% of charges is that charges are set
exorbitantly high.  O’Connor also notes that, if the EMS company does
not join the network, reimbursement may not be much improved.  “It’s
[the rate paid to providers by out-of-network insurers] often at a rate that
they [the insurers] decide unilaterally, and is very low relative to the
charge.”224  However, as noted above, the big benefit to not being in-net-
work is not the reimbursement received from the insurance company, it is
the legal right of the ambulance provider to balance bill the patient.225
Since margins are thin for Medicare and in-network patients, am-
bulance providers often avoid negotiating contracts with insur-
ance companies or charge out-of-network individuals
significantly higher rates in order to compensate . . . .  But the
system fails people who happen to take an out-of-network ambu-
lance or don’t have insurance.  In that case, the provider is free
to charge any amount it sees fit, and the bills are often steep.226
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 18 (“In-network reimbursements are some-
times just 50 percent of the charges or a percentage of the Medicare reimburse-
ment rate.”).  If the emergency ambulance provider does not join the network,
then reimbursement from private insurance is set unilaterally by the insurance
company, but the patient is liable for the balance. See id.
219. See id.
220. See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
221. See id.
222. See Andrews, supra note 18.
223. See KELSEY OLIVER, IBIS WORLD INDUSTRY REPORT 62191: AMBULANCE SER-
VICES IN THE U.S., IBISWORLD 4, 6, 8 (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter IBIS REPORT].
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.
226. See Medearis, supra note 10.
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In addition, according to Candice Butcher, president and chief executive
of Medical Billing Advocates of America, in-network rates are often 65% to
70% of charges.227  In other words, ambulance providers voluntarily enter
into contracts with insurance companies in which they agree to accept
65% to 75% of their list prices as payment in full.  Again, I think it is very
unlikely that providers would voluntarily enter into agreements that pro-
vided for reimbursement without a reasonable profit margin.  This, cou-
pled with an average overall profit margin for the ambulance industry of
7.5%228 indicates that charges are exorbitant.
C. Determining the Reasonable Value of Emergency Ambulance Service
It is clear that the charges demanded by many ambulance service
providers are exorbitant and do not represent the fair and reasonable
value of the services that they provide.229  This begs the question: What is
the fair and reasonable value of emergency ambulance services?  Based on
the data discussed above, the Medicare reimbursement rates reflected in
the AFS are a much better place to start determining fair value than are
the exaggerated charges demanded by providers.230  However, it seems
quite possible that the reimbursement amounts established in the AFS are
too low to be used unadjusted to determine the fair and reasonable value
of emergency ambulance services.231  Recall that these reimbursement
rates with the add-on provisions only exceed the median provider’s costs
by 2%.232  As a result, I suggest that the AFS amounts be adjusted upward
in order to arrive at a fair and reasonable value.233  The question then
becomes: By how much should the AFS amount be adjusted?
1. Fair Rates
Before we discuss the appropriate adjustment to be made to the AFS
amount, it is important to discuss a broader issue.  The issue is whether it
is justified to overcharge some patients because other patients are not pay-
ing their fair share.  In some ways, emergency ambulance service provid-
ers, like many hospitals, have taken the Willie Sutton approach to billing.
Willie Sutton reputedly replied to a reporter’s inquiry as to why he robbed
banks by saying “because that’s where the money is.”234  In the case of
ambulance services, patients who have insurance and means, but happen
227. See Andrews, supra note 18 (negotiating for in-network rate can reduce
bill from out-of-network provider by 30–35%).
228. See IBIS REPORT, supra note 222, at 4, 6, 8.
229. See supra notes 125–56 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 157–96 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 253–71 and accompanying text.
234. See Quote by Willie Sutton—“That’s Where the Money Is,” SNOPES, http://
www.snopes.com/quotes/sutton.asp [https://perma.cc/YUU4-VNWF] (last visited
Dec. 2, 2016).
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to be transported by an out-of-network provider, face the highest
out-of-pocket costs.235  Put simply, this is because these patients can afford
to pay and, in spite of the unfairness, often find that paying the exorbitant
bill is the least costly alternative for them.  For example, an ambulance
company transported Maria and Gerald Kinghorn’s “son to the hospital a
few miles away after he crashed on the interstate near their Utah home
and knocked out four teeth.”236  The charge was $1,700,237 or roughly
three times the applicable AFS amount.238  The Kinghorn’s automobile
and health insurers had paid $900, but the ambulance company balance
billed the Kinghorns for the $800 balance.239  Notwithstanding the exces-
sive bill, Maria decided to pay up: “We didn’t want to have our credit ru-
ined for $800,” she told Kaiser Health News.240
It is a fact that some patients lack insurance coverage, the ability to
pay their bill, or both.  Chief paramedic Josh Nultemeier of King Ameri-
can Ambulance in San Francisco states that: “[Fifty] percent of the calls we
go on we don’t get any reimbursement for.”241  One estimate puts the
collection rate (the percentage of ambulance charges that are actually
paid) in San Diego County at just 33%.242  As noted above, this could be
an indication that billed charges are extreme, or it could also be an indica-
tion that ambulance companies recover less than their cost from some
patients.  It seems very likely that both interpretations are correct.  That is,
charges are extreme and in some cases the ambulance company does not
even cover their costs.
When first responders respond to a call, they do not know whether
they are picking up a customer who can pay or not.  Of course, some
might say that this situation is not unique to emergency ambulance ser-
vice.  For example, when a store sells on credit, it never knows whether the
customer will in fact make full payment.  It is also true that everyone who
shops in a store that sells on credit pays higher prices to cover the amounts
not paid by customers who default on their credit obligations.  Likewise,
non-shoplifting customers also pay the costs caused by those who shoplift.
However, there is an important distinction in the case of emergency ambu-
lance services and that is this: the patient has no choice with respect to
which ambulance service they use.243  This is very different than the situa-
tion involving retail shoppers.  For example, if a particular store’s prices
235. See Medearis, supra note 10.
236. See Andrews, supra note 18.
237. See id.
238. See Rosenthal, supra note 49 (noting that Medicare rates for 2011 ranged
between $289 and $481; thus, $1,700 charge represented 350% of Medicare’s high
rate).
239. See Andrews, supra note 18.
240. See id.
241. See Medearis, supra note 10.
242. See id.
243. See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text.
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are very high because it makes poor credit decisions or fails to adequately
control shoplifting, customers have the freedom to decide that prices are
too high and to shop elsewhere.  This is not the case with respect to emer-
gency ambulance services.244  That is, patients have no choice over which
ambulance service they use.245  As a result, while I sympathize with the fact
that some ambulance service providers struggle to make ends meet, that is
not, in my estimation, a sufficient justification for grossly overcharging
those who can pay.246
Amanda Brewer, a working mother from Carrollton, Mississippi, who
lacks health insurance, faced a struggle with medical bankruptcy after her
son broke his femur in her backyard.247  The ambulance charge was
$2,448.50.248  Though Brewer initially negotiated to pay the charge in in-
stallments, the collection agency demanded the payment in full several
months later.249  The agency only relented when Brewer asked whether
they would prefer that she declare medical bankruptcy.250  But while
Brewer avoided bankruptcy, many others do not.251  A recent study found
that medical bills are the largest source of bankruptcies in the United
States.252
2. Fair and Reasonable Price Range
Based on the information discussed in the preceding section, it is
clear that Medicare reimbursements based on the AFS should be the basis
of the courts’ determination of the fair and reasonable value of emergency
ambulance services.253  However, the AFS rate should be adjusted upward
in the range of 15% to 65% to arrive at a fair and reasonable reimburse-
ment amount.254  I believe that a good estimate of the fair and reasonable
value of emergency ambulance services lies somewhere in the range of
115% to 165% of the AFS reimbursement amount.255
244. See Medearis, supra note 10 (“The fundamental problem with the eco-
nomics of ambulance transport is that patients have almost no ability to make an
informed choice.”).
245. See id. (“As the costs of America’s patchwork system vary dramatically,
whether a patient receives a manageable bill or a crippling one is ultimately a
matter of chance.”).
246. Moreover, the vast difference in provider costs per trip ($224–$2,204)
show that there is no intrinsic reason that costs must be so high. See GAO AMBU-
LANCE REPORT, supra note 124, at 10.  Competition in the industry is needed to
create the economies of scale that will bring down the per trip cost of readiness.





252. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
254. See infra notes 266–67 and accompanying text.
255. See id.
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Notwithstanding the limitations of the GAO data,256 I  have used that
data along with other available data257 and anecdotal information258 to
arrive at this range of fair value.  Based on the GAO data for 2010, 90% of
providers had costs per transport between $253 and $924.259  Also for
2010, average Medicare reimbursement for ground ambulance transports
was about $464.260  A very rough average of the cost is $589, calculated by
simply taking the average of $253 and $924.261  The middle of the range
that I suggest would produce a reimbursement of $650 for 2010.262  This
provides for about a 10% profit if average costs are $589, which is in the
ballpark of indications of the industry profit of a little over 8%.263  How-
ever, the quality of the data do not support such fine-tuned analysis, which
is why I suggest a range of fair value.  In addition, the GAO data makes no
distinction between emergency and nonemergency service, and the focus
in this Article is exclusively on emergency service, which has a higher cost
associated with it than nonemergency service.264
At the low end of the cost range, the low fair price that I suggest of
115% of the average Medicare reimbursement rate would produce a pay-
ment of $534, which, based on the GAO numbers, would produce a profit
margin of 111% for low-cost providers.265  On the other hand, for
high-cost providers, the high range of reimbursement that I suggest of
165% of the Medicare rate would produce a payment of $766, which
would produce a $158 loss or about a -17% margin.266  I think it is a good
idea to reward providers who can keep their costs low and to push high-
256. See GAO AMBULANCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 5–6 (discussing limita-
tions of study).
257. See, e.g., HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 164, at 22–32; IBIS RE-
PORT, supra note 222, at 33.
258. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 18 (containing story recounting experience
of individuals with emergency ambulance service bills); Coffey, supra note 3
(same); Gilbert, supra note 8 (same); Kieler, supra note 18 (same); Medearis, supra
note 10 (same); Rosenthal, supra note 49 (same); Roser, supra note 17 (same);
Zamosky, supra note 1 (same).
259. See GAO AMBULANCE REPORT, supra note 124, at 10.
260. See id. at 22.
261. See id. at 10 ((253 + 924) / 2) = 588.5 =~ 589).
262. That is, 140% of 464 = 650.
263. That is, (650-589) / 589 = .1036.
264. See GAO AMBULANCE REPORT, supra note 124, at 13 n.29 (noting that
providers’ costs increase with intensity level (emergency versus non-emergency
and ALS versus BIS) of transport, although this finding is contrary to findings in
2007 GAO report).
265. That is, 1.15 x 464 = $534, and low cost for 90% of providers based on
the GAO numbers is 253 for a profit of 534-253 = 281 and 281/253 = 1.11. See id. at
10.
266. That is, 1.65 x 464 = $766, and high cost for 90% of providers based on
the GAO numbers is 924 for a loss of 766-924 = -158 or -158/924 = -.17. See id.
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cost providers to lower their costs.267  Finally, let me reiterate that I would
prefer to base fair and reasonable value on the actual contracted-for reim-
bursements that the provider receives.268  In addition, as I have discussed
elsewhere, it may be appropriate to increase the average private reim-
bursement rate to reflect the benefits that private insurers provide to am-
bulance companies.269  Although, in the case of emergency ambulance
services, these benefits are limited to quick and assured payment.270  How-
ever, based on my research, this data seems unlikely to be widely available,
and therefore it will often be necessary to rely on Medicare’s AFS as a basis
for determining fair and reasonable value.271
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTING PATIENTS FROM SURPRISE
MEDICAL BILLS FOR EMERGENCY AMBULANCE SERVICES
In the case of emergency ambulance services, patients are often taken
advantage of because of the vulnerable position in which they happen to
find themselves, through no fault of their own.272  Patients have no con-
trol over which ambulance service is called in an emergency and often are
not even aware that they are receiving services at the time they are pro-
vided.273  This is why, as noted above, the law of quasi-contract, and not
the law of real contracts, governs the relationship between ambulance
companies and patients in the case of emergency ambulance service.274
Moreover, even if the patient is conscious when the ambulance arrives,
patients typically and logically defer to the suggestions of the medical per-
sonnel present and, as a result, often accept the service not because they
think they need it but because they are encouraged to do so by the EMS
providers on the scene.275  In addition, even when the ambulance bills are
unreasonably high, they often remain within the realm of possible pay-
ment for many patients, and even though the amount demanded is unfair,
many patients, as noted above, find that they are left with no other practi-
cal choice than to pay the unfair amount demanded by the ambulance
company.276  The choice often comes down to paying the unfair bill, risk-
267. This will encourage efficiency and the GAO Report notes that generous
government reimbursements have the opposite effect. See id. at 15 (noting that as
government subsidies decrease, so do costs).
268. Cf. Nation, Determining, supra note 27, at 460–65 (discussing benefits of
using market-determined rate when possible).
269. See id. at 449–51.
270. See id. at 461–65.
271. See, e.g., Medearis, supra note 10 (“Charges for ambulance transportation
vary dramatically across the U.S. and from provider to provider.”).
272. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
273. See id.
274. See supra notes 82–123 and accompanying text.
275. See Rosenthal, supra note 49 (“[W]hen an ambulance arrives, sick pa-
tients or injured people . . . often feel they have little choice but to get in, unaware
of the potential price tag.”).
276. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
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ing damage to one’s credit rating by simply refusing to pay or by paying
only a portion of the bill, or hiring an attorney to challenge the bill.277
Unfortunately, under the United States legal system, attorneys’ fees are
generally not awarded as part of damages absent either a statutory require-
ment or a contrary agreement between the parties.278  As a result, even a
successful lawsuit challenging the bill may leave the patient out-of-pocket
in an amount equal to or greater than the bill itself.  Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that many patients who can pay do pay.279  As one patient succinctly
put it: “[T]his is a real set up.”280
A. The Role of the Courts
The courts can provide some immediate relief to this problem in
cases where patients have refused to pay and are sued by the ambulance
service providers by requiring the ambulance service providers to prove
the reasonableness of their charges.  That is, in any action filed by provid-
ers, or by bill collectors acting in their place, to collect payment for emer-
gency ambulance services courts, as discussed above should refuse to
accept the reasonable and customary amount charged as a proxy for the
reasonable value of the services provided.281  Instead, courts should re-
quire proof from the provider or bill collector that the charges are fair
and reasonable.  Specifically, I would encourage courts to begin from the
position that about 115% of the Medicare reimbursement amount estab-
lished by the AFS is the fair and reasonable value of the services provided,
unless the provider can establish by clear and convincing evidence that
this amount is not fair and reasonable by, for example, showing that it
routinely receives a higher amount as payment for the same services pur-
suant to contracts with insurance companies.282
Court decisions establishing 115% of the AFS as a benchmark for de-
termining the fair and reasonable value of emergency ambulance services
will help to alleviate the problem of patients being taken advantage of by
unconscionable emergency ambulance charges.  This will not, however,
help those who can pay the exorbitant charges and pay them because they
fear damage to their credit rating or fear having to pay legal fees on top of
the steep ambulance charges if they lose in court.283  Thus, as discussed in
277. See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text.
278. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 85, at 569 (noting in United States,
award of damages does not ordinarily include reimbursement of successful party’s
attorneys’ fees).
279. See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text.
280. See id.
281. See supra notes 138–56 and accompanying text.
282. For this purpose, it is important to distinguish between out-of-network
insurers and in-network insurers; only in-network rates should be used because
these are rates agreed to by both parties.
283. See supra notes 276–80 and accompanying text.
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the next section, the legislature must also play a role in addressing this
issue.
B. Legislative Action
There is currently no federal protection from balance bills for insured
patients who receive emergency or nonemergency medical care out-of-net-
work.284  The ACA, while it does protect members of non-grandfathered
plans from increased cost sharing between in-network and out-of-network
providers with respect to emergency care services, does not protect pa-
tients from balance billing even for emergency services, including emer-
gency ambulance services.285  However, a few state legislatures are
providing statutory solutions to the problem of surprise medical bills in
either the emergency or nonemergency context.286  Surprise billing oc-
curs when a patient has gone to an in-network facility but is treated by out-
of-network physicians or others.287
C. Legislation Addressing Surprise Balance Billing
Legislation in this area is motivated, inter alia, by the recognition that
when insurance companies and providers disagree regarding payment
amounts, patients unfairly get caught in the middle.288  For example, in
some cases, insurance providers have decided to send checks directly to
patients rather than to the providers, in order to force the providers to go
through the more difficult process of obtaining payment from the pa-
tient.289  This is often done because insurers feel that ambulance compa-
nies have acted unreasonably in refusing to become part of the
network.290
284. See, e.g., JACK HOADLEY ET AL., BALANCE BILLING: HOW ARE STATES PRO-
TECTING CONSUMERS FROM UNEXPECTED CHARGES?, THE CENTER ON HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE REFORMS, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE 3 (2015),
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2015/rwjf420966
[https://perma.cc/8SXK-EJWM].
285. See Karen Pollitz, Surprise Medical Bills, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Mar. 17, 2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-surprise-medical-bills
[https://perma.cc/C4L5-5XWR].
286. See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 284, at 7–11 (noting that under federal
law (Employer Retirement Income Security Act or ERISA), employer-sponsored
plans that are self-funded by employer are generally exempt from state regulation
and as a result patients with self-funded employer health plans are not protected
from balance bills even in few states that provide statutory protection).
287. See id. at 4 (describing “Scenario 3: Surprise Billing Situation in a Net-
work Hospital”).
288. See id.
289. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 18 (discussing Maryland law that “requires
insurers to send ambulance reimbursement for 911 calls directly to the provider
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Legislation addressing this type of problem can take several different
forms, but in all cases it is designed to ensure the consumers are not liable
for charges that are outside of their control.291  Most of this legislation is
focused on protecting patients from surprise balance bills from hospitals
and doctors in a variety of different contexts, rather than being focused
specifically on bills for emergency ambulance services.292  However, some
legislation in this area is likely to apply to emergency ambulance billing
even if it is not referenced specifically, and in some cases emergency am-
bulance billing is referenced specifically.293  For example, in Maryland,
legislation provides that out-of-network insurance companies must pay di-
rectly to ambulance service providers for covered services but also prohib-
its providers that receive direct reimbursement from an insurer from
balance billing out-of-network patients (other than to collect any copay-
ment, deductible, or coinsurance amount applicable).294  In other words,
insurers must pay directly to providers, and providers can only sue the
insurance company for more money—not patients.295
2. Balancing the Interests of Providers and Insurers
From the perspective of patients, this is an excellent solution that
takes the patient out of the dispute between insurance companies and
EMS providers over the correct level of payments.  However, care in draft-
ing such legislation must be taken to balance the interests of both provid-
ers and insurers.  States that have passed legislation in this area have taken
one of two different approaches to protecting consumers, and each of
these approaches affects insurers and providers differently.296  One ap-
proach is to require that insurers hold their members harmless from bal-
ance bills in the context of, for example, emergency treatment.297  The
other approach is to prohibit providers from balance billing in situations,
291. See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 284, at 14. (noting that shared goal of this
legislation is ensuring that consumers are not liable for charges that are mostly
outside of their control).
292. See id. (noting that only a few states have acted through legislation to
protect consumers against unexpected charges that result when providers send bal-
ance bills to their patients and noting even those states enacting protections typi-
cally limit scope to scenarios in which consumers have limited control, and
sometimes protections apply only to certain types of insurance, for example, some
states apply protections to HMOs but not to PPOs).
293. See id. at 4 (noting that one scenario in which this legislation applies
concerns emergency settings and suggesting that ambulance services may also fall
under this scenario).
294. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 18 (discussing Maryland law that “requires
insurers to send payment for 911 calls directly to the provider . . . but also prohibits
providers from billing consumers for balances beyond the reimbursed amount”).
295. See id.
296. See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 284, at 5–11 (discussing various ap-
proaches states have taken to protecting consumers from balance billing).
297. See id.
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such as emergency treatment, where the statute applies.298  In those states
taking the hold-harmless approach, the financial risk is borne by the insur-
ance company, as they may be forced to pay providers’ unilaterally deter-
mined list prices even if they believe them to be unreasonably high,
because the statute requires that they hold their members harmless from
any financial liability to the provider.299  On the other hand, in states that
prohibit balance billing in certain contexts, the financial risk is placed on
providers.300  The provider may be forced to accept the payment amount
unilaterally determined by the insurance company even though the pro-
vider thinks that it is unreasonably small.301  This is because the insurance
company has a contract with the patient and not with the provider (unless
the insurance company is in-network with the provider, in which case the
balance-billing problem does not arise).  As a result, there is no contract
claim that the provider may bring against the insurer, because the insur-
ance company owes no contractual obligation to the ambulance pro-
vider.302  This is why balance billing claims are brought against the patient
rather than the insurance company.303  Thus, if the ambulance provider
feels as though the reimbursement amount paid and unilaterally estab-
lished by the insurance company is too small, the ambulance company
would have no right legally to contest the insurance company’s
determination.304
Most of the states that have passed legislation in this area have ad-
dressed this problem in one of two ways: either by setting repayment levels
directly or by establishing formulas to be used to arrive at fair repayment
amounts or, more commonly, by providing for some type of dispute reso-
lution system.305  In both cases, the intent is to protect the interests of
both insurers and providers.306
For example, California has taken the approach of prohibiting physi-





302. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
304. Cf. Crain’s New York Business, New York Law to Curb Surprise Billing Shows
Promising Results, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.modernhealth
care.com/article/20160407/NEWS/304079996 [https://perma.cc/6QF2-5V5M]
(discussing New York legislation and its process for resolving disputes between in-
surers and providers); Harris Meyer, Florida Governor Signs Law Shielding Patients
from Surprise Medical Bills, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 14, 2016), http://
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160414/NEWS/160419946 (discussing
similar law for Florida); Harris Meyer, Passage of California Surprise-Bill Legislation
Could Spur Other States to Act, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Sept. 1, 2016), http://
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160901/NEWS/160909980 [https://
perma.cc/5VYE-J8FV] (discussing similar legislation for California).
305. See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 284, at 7–11.
306. See id. at 6–7.
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ance plans pay providers a “reasonable and customary” payment rate.
However, California requires that reasonable and customary rates be
based on statistically credible and up-to-date information.307  California
also provides a voluntary, nonbinding independent dispute resolution pro-
cess, although so far it has been little used.308
Colorado, on the other hand, requires insurance plans hold their
members harmless in both emergency and nonemergency surprise billing
situations.309  As a result, in Colorado, this often results in insurers having
to pay providers’ full billed charges.310
In New York, balance billing in emergency situations is prohibited
and it is also prohibited in surprise billing situations as long as the patient
assigns insurance benefits to the provider.311  New York also provides an
independent dispute resolution system that uses licensed physicians in ac-
tive practice and allows them to, inter alia, choose either the provider’s
original billed charge or the insurance plan’s original payment amount,
but not any other amount.312  This is a very interesting provision that is
intended to have the desirable effect of encouraging both providers and
insurers to set reasonable rates.  That is, if either party sets an unreasona-
ble rate, that party risks having it rejected in favor of the other party’s rate
rather than some middle ground between the two prices.  The closer the
two parties’ prices are set to begin with, the less likely the parties will be to
resort to the dispute resolution system.
While only a handful of states have provided legislative solutions so
far, this approach is very promising.313  It certainly seems reasonable to
assume that insurers and providers can work out reasonable payment
amounts given that these parties have the information, ability, and, in the
presence of well-drafted legislation, the incentive to deal effectively with
one another.
VI. CONCLUSION
In many ways, the problems associated with overcharging for emer-
gency ambulance services are similar to the problems associated with ex-




310. See id. at 7.
311. See id. at 8 (noting this is important to providers because it means that
they will receive payment, albeit not their full list charges, quickly rather than hav-
ing to acquire payment directly from patient).
312. See id. at 8–9.
313. It is important to note that the plans that have been passed so far by the
states, while similar, also have significant differences.  For example, application of
the provisions in some cases depends on the type of insurance, HMO, EPO, or
PPO.  In addition, passing such legislation can be politically difficult.  A detailed
discussion of these various approaches is beyond the scope of this paper.
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problems manifest themselves through the practice of balance billing in-
sured but out-of-network patients314 in order to collect the full amount of
the extortionate list prices demanded by hospitals, doctors, ambulance
companies, and other health care providers.  In both cases, Medicare pa-
tients and patients with good health insurance (i.e., broad networks and
low deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance rates) that is in the pro-
vider’s network (so the patient is considered to be in-network) are pro-
tected from the problem of balance billing.  In both cases, the burden falls
most heavily on self-pay patients including those who are uninsured, un-
derinsured, or insured but out-of-network and therefore subject to bal-
ance billing.315  However, and also in both cases, the greedy list prices
ultimately contribute to the ever-increasing price of health care and, as a
result, adversely affect all patients, including those who are not directly
subject to balance billing.316  Finally, the root causes of both problems are
also the same, and they are the odd characteristics of health insurance
reimbursement schemes (past and present) coupled with the lack of
meaningful price competition for health care at the consumer level.317
These are the causes of the current highly inflated list prices for all types
of health care.
However, while the problems are similar, they are not the same.  The
most important distinction between the problems of extreme charges for
emergency medical care including ambulance service and extreme
charges for health care in general is that the nature of emergency health
care precludes the possibility of ever having meaningful consumer-level
price competition.318  Another important difference is that many ambu-
lance companies are not in-network with any insurers and, as a result, bal-
ance billing for emergency ambulance services is more common than it is
for health care billing in general.319  With regard to the balance-billing
problem in the context of hospital billing, I have argued elsewhere for
adopting measures designed to create robust consumer-level price compe-
tition in order to rein in exorbitant chargemaster-based prices.320  In the
ambulance balance billing context, this approach will not work because
patients are in need of acute and immediate medical care, and therefore
consumers will never be able to choose their emergency ambulance ser-
vice provider based on competitive market forces.  As a result, a legislative
solution is necessary to properly solve the emergency health care (includ-
ing emergency ambulance services) balance-billing problem.321
314. The uninsured and underinsured also bear the brunt of these problems.
See, e.g., Nation, Hospital Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 27, at 761–66.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 766–70.
317. See id. at 750–60.
318. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 105–17 and accompanying text.
320. See Nation, The Balance-Billing Problem, supra note 27, at 168–74.
321. See supra notes 284–314 and accompanying text.
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The legislative solution that I suggest, as noted above, is similar to
what several states have already done, and takes the consumer out of the
middle of the dispute between the insurance company and the ambulance
company concerning the appropriate fee to be paid for the services pro-
vided.322  Also as noted, such legislation must provide balance between
the interests of both insurers and providers in establishing a fair and rea-
sonable price.323
While we await a legislative solution, and perhaps even after the legis-
lation is passed in the case of the uninsured, the courts have an important
role to play in reining in the abuses associated with billing for emergency
ambulance services just as they do in reining in similar billing abuses for
health care in general.324  The most important contribution the courts
can make to solve these problems is to reject the traditional approach to
establishing the fair value of medical services in general, including emer-
gency ambulance services, that has been based on the usual and customary
charges of providers in the same geographic area where the services were
provided.325  As noted, list prices or billed charges have become greatly
inflated and completely unrelated to value due to the combined effects of
insurance reimbursement schemes and a lack of consumer-level price
competition.326  As a result, charges no longer serve as a good proxy for
fair value.327  Rather, the best measure of fair value is the amount that is
actually paid and accepted as full payment by providers in the area where
the services were rendered.  However, in the case of emergency ground
services this data is limited and, as a result, I suggest that courts use Medi-
care’s AFS as a starting point and then adjust that amount upward in the
range of 15% to 65% in order to arrive at a fair and reasonable value for
emergency ground ambulance services.328  Taking the steps recom-
mended here, both legislative and judicial, will help to protect vulnerable
patients from being taken advantage of and also help to control the over-
all cost of health care.
322. See id.
323. See id.




328. See supra notes 253–71 and accompanying text.
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